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Was Ella Fitzgerald right?  
 
 
 
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues, students, my 
dearest Lies, 
 
1. Introduction 
It is a great honor to present to you my inaugural speech on behalf of accepting 
the governor‟s chair: “Openbaar bestuur in kleinschalige rechtsordes”, i.e. 
“Public Governance in Small Systems of Law” here at the University of Aruba. 
It is a post installed by the governor within this beautiful university for 
academic purposes. As it says in the job description, this chair will give special 
attention to the development of governance in relation to the available 
capacities, and to the conditions needed for an effective and transparent public 
administration, taking the cultural context into account. Later on in the same 
memo a crucial question is posed, namely the question “in what way can 
institutions be strengthened or designed in order to shape a public 
administration that fits a small system of law and which is in conformity with 
the general requirements for good governance”. Well now, if you expect me to 
give answers to those questions during this inaugural speech, I have to 
disappoint you. I start this post modestly, without any pretences, but with a lot 
of questions only to be answered after doing thorough research. 
One of those questions that has come between me and my sleep for a long time 
is a very complex one, although it finds its origin in a simple, but beautiful song 
by Ella Fitzgerald. I refer to the song: It ain’t what you do, it’s the way that you 
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do it’. Nowadays this song is translated in an adage for Public Administration 
in its emphasis on good governance. As we are told again and again: “It does 
not matter what government does, as long as it does it in a legitimate, 
transparent, accountable, efficient way, with regulatory quality and control of 
corruption”. This is nowadays called “good governance”. Kofi Annan in his 
function of secretary general of the UN said about good governance that it is 
perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting 
development
1
.  
2. The trend towards governance 
This is nicely said, but what does it imply? What is that thing called 
governance, and what does it explain? Governance is a concept that many 
scholars have addressed before. When asked what governance is exactly, many 
different answers can be and are usually given. The most simple definition, 
having my support, is that governance is nothing else than the conduct of 
government. This is nevertheless rather different from the interpretations given 
to governance in the last 20 years. Below I will argue that it has become a 
concept that includes more and more phenomena related to the steering of 
societal developments Originally it was seen as an alternative for government. 
It was – according to the scholars of that time - something like the final blow 
for government that had to accept that society cannot be hierarchically steered 
or controlled. The steering of developments had to be left to societal actors and 
had to be accomplished through networks in which hierarchy hardly played a 
role. In the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s the interpretation 
changed. There was a role for government in governance, but this was not a 
dominant role. According to Raadschelders governance refers to all 
organizations and institutions that are involved in the structuring of society, 
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including governmental as well as non-governmental actors and independent 
agencies, without any one of them being dominant2. According to others, 
governance is a key concept in contemporary analyses of policy networks3. It is 
only recently that the role of government and the creation of good institutions 
by government is deemed important again. Scholars began to realize that 
government should do what it is supposed to do, that is, at least create security, 
protect property rights, reduce societal problems and take back its leading role 
in controlling and steering societal developments (See for instance the recent 
literature on failed states and nation building). 
3. The dubious implications of good governance 
If the popularity of the concept would only be used to describe different trends 
in the steering of societal developments there would not be a problem. One can 
analyze what is going on, try to explain it and test the findings. 
However, the term governance has become dangerous in that scholars as well as 
(international) organizations have added a normative prefix to it, namely „good‟ 
and have added a large number of criteria for „good governance‟. These 
scholars and international organizations have imposed an agenda on 
governments which by now has become overloaded. In practice good 
governance implies large-scale institutionalization, formalization and 
regulation. In terms of the almost 50 year old classic of Michel Crozier, it is 
formalization as risk-avoidance
4
. 
I have three potential problems with the concept of good governance:  
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1. Emphasizing only one dimension of government (institution building in 
order to achieve good governance) implies neglecting other equally 
important dimensions (outputs, outcomes), and even has negative side-
effects
5
; 
2. There is the problem of overload and cost-inefficiency involved in building 
one institution after the other under the guise of good governance. This 
creates complexity where parsimony might be in order; 
3. The institutionalization supposedly needed to achieve good governance is in 
the end a kind of one-size-fits-all solution, where tailor-made solutions 
could be more effective. 
3.1. The neglect of outputs and outcomes 
Governments should act according to all the criteria of good governance. That 
is, on the basis of rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control 
of corruption. If a government would proceed in this way and improve itself as 
much as possible on these dimensions, this is supposed to be sufficient for 
eradicating societal problems. 
This assumption is quite different from earlier explanations for socio-economic 
development, in which for instance, economic growth is induced by the actual 
contents of the policies a government develops and implements. Such theories 
point to the need for demand-side or supply-side policies, that is, tax policies, 
stabilizing interest rates, controlling public expenditures on the one hand and 
promoting education and training, research and development and mobility on the other 
hand.  
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The idea that the way in which governments act is more important than what they 
actually do, constitutes one of the many, many dubious assumptions, or to put it 
benevolently, hypotheses, surrounding governance. It is a problematic 
supposition especially in relation to the scale of a system of law, when human 
resources are scarce and when it would take a disproportionate part of the 
financial resources available to improve the process at the expense of 
improving outputs and outcomes. 
One might even expect that ongoing formal institutionalization in small systems 
of law has its limitations and even drawbacks, because such systems have the 
historical advantage of the possibility of informality in which 
institutionalization might be redundant and even counterproductive.  
At present, one of my students is doing a PhD study asking herself whether 
there is an optimum amount of institutionalization of public participation 
processes. As we know, public participation is not always effective and often a 
tiresome process in which the stakeholders are disappointed in the end. 
Sometimes this is the consequence of such processes resembling a brainstorm 
session, being unstructured and free-floating. In other cases it is the 
consequence of such participation being completely bureaucratized (cf. De 
Vries, 20006), i.e. administrators already telling beforehand what the alternative 
options are, what the relevant criteria are and how many times the stakeholders 
can meet. Just to tell an anecdote from the Netherlands: in one case of public 
participation the agreement was to have three meetings. However, it proved that 
another meeting was needed. However, this was not according to the rules 
agreed upon. Hence, a zero‟th meeting was invented. 
Such experiences tell us that there might be some optimum of 
institutionalization in between the two extremes. A crucial question is to locate 
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this optimum, but the one-million dollar question is whether the location of this 
optimum is the same everywhere, which would make for universal and 
therefore efficient recommendations regarding the planning of such processes. 
The more realistic answer is that such an optimum is culture-bound and it is 
necessary to perceive such an optimum of institutionalization as being 
contingent. This implies that in practice one needs to adjust the procedures to 
the specific characteristics of the context. This outcome would result in more 
complex recommendations regarding the planning of such processes, but would 
probably be far more effective. 
That the optimum might be in between is also seen in research done by 
Euwema and others
7
 into the way governments deal with complaints. Many 
complainants are dissatisfied after going through the whole procedure and 
judge the procedure to have been overly formal
8. Euwema‟s research suggests 
that in some cases governments can deal more informally with such complaints. 
Where to be on a scale that runs from complete formalism on the one hand to a 
completely informal reaction by just making a telephone call at the other 
extreme seems to depend primarily on the nature of the issue and characteristics 
of the complainant. The nature of the complaint can concern a request for 
missing information, an administrative error, improper behavior by the official, 
insufficiently tailor-made policies or disputes on fundamental principles. 
According to Euwema, the former issues can do without a formal approach, 
whereas the latter cannot. Characteristics of the complainant are also important. 
Does the complainant just want to be treated fairly or have the idea that he is 
treated fairly (procedural justice) or does the complainant want to make a point 
and to win a procedure against government (instrumental justice)? To push this 
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idea further, the proper way to handle complaints might also be contingent, that 
is, dependent on the uncertainty, dynamics of the context, its culture and socio-
economic development and as a matter of fact the scale of the system. I will 
return to this point later. That is important, was argued by Herweijer and 
Lunsink. They tell us that although an informal approach in dealing with 
complainants is not always optimal and dependent on the context, the nature of 
the issue and the characteristics of the complainant, less formalism in dealing 
with complaining citizens where this is possible, might well result in more 
acceptance by the complainant (higher legitimacy), a shortening of the run time 
and diminishing administrative costs (efficiency)
9
. 
3.2. The overloaded agenda 
Another assumption with regard to good governance is that all the mentioned 
dimensions thereof  are expected to have positive effects and that this also goes 
for any dimension added to the concept. For governments wanting to have good 
governance or on which the criteria for good governance are imposed, this 
results in an overloaded agenda, sometimes squandering all the desperately 
needed resources to induce socio-economic growth and probably being 
counterproductive in that regard. Overloaded also, because there is no 
prioritizing between the criteria or dimensions. Overlooking the period from 
1995 until now, many aspects and dimensions were added to the concept of 
governance. At first the number of criteria were not that many. The UNDP, for 
instance, saw five good governance principles, namely legitimacy and voice 
(including participation and consensus orientation), direction (including 
strategic vision) performance (including responsiveness, effectiveness and 
efficiency) accountability (including transparency) and fairness (including 
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equity and rule of law)10 The World Bank has given six dimensions to the 
concept, namely: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption (Faqs provided by World Bank).  
Five or six dimensions does not seem to be too bad. However, behind each of 
the dimensions there are multiple indicators. If we, for instance, only look at the 
number of indicators measuring the dimension „government effectiveness‟ as 
done by the World Bank, there are more than 40 indicators11. A similar 
complexity in indicators is visible for the other five dimensions, resulting in an 
agenda for improving governance, that is really huge with over 150 indicators. 
In this sense the concept has become „slippery‟12 (Kettl, 2002: 119).  
One of the first critics on this abuse of the term good governance was Merilee 
Grindle. She tells us that most of the good governance agenda is about what 
governments need to do to put their political, administrative, and financial 
houses in better order. At the same time, many governments (in countries 
lacking the financial and/or human resources) not only have low capacity to 
carry out such commitments, but are also locked in conflicts of interests 
between trying to do the right things and doing things right. That consumes 
their energies and resources (Grindle: 2004: 539). Furthermore, according to 
her, it is not at all self-evident that improving governance in all these aspects 
will result in a reduction of the societal and managerial problems those 
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governments face. The innovations may provide short-term responses to serious 
governance deficits, but may not provide long-term solutions. Furthermore, 
because the conceptualization is often a-historical, solutions insufficiently take 
the difficult trade-offs and dilemmas into account, and neglect the distinct 
features of the contexts and the varying levels of development in different 
countries. This is congruent with the argument of Collier in his recent book 
about the bottom billion, namely that bad governance is only one of the traps in 
which countries are caught.13.  
Grindle argues that the good governance agenda is unrealistically long and 
growing longer over time. Among the multitude of governance reforms that 
“must be done”, there is little guidance about what‟s essential and what‟s not, 
what should come first and what should follow, what can be achieved in the 
short-term and what can only be achieved over the longer term, what is feasible 
and what is not. If more attention is given to sorting out these questions, “good 
enough governance” may become a more realistic goal for many countries.14 
Good enough governance is described as governance that scores high on those 
factors that do matter for the reduction of societal problems, although it may 
fail on other indicators of good governance which are less relevant in a specific 
context. 
The idea of good enough governance is comparable to the scientific principle of 
striving for parsimony. In this case it asks which known dimensions of good 
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governance and indicators for these dimensions pose the necessary and 
sufficient conditions to explain economic growth and reduction of poverty. 
Originally known as Ockham‟s razor, the parsimony principle states that the 
explanation of any phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible, 
eliminating those that make no difference in the observable predictions of the 
explanatory hypothesis or theory. Swinburne argued for such simplicity on 
logical grounds: "...other things being equal -- the simplest hypothesis proposed 
as an explanation of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any 
other available hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than 
those of any other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate, a priori, 
epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence for truth" (Swinburne 199715).  
Why did we never apply this principle to our Public Administrations and why 
do we – despite our knowledge that the best way to do things, to conduct 
policies, to structure organizations is contingent - never ask ourselves what the 
important dimensions in the relevant context are and on a meta-level whether 
the relevance of these dimensions might vary amongst contexts. It is the 
question whether in small states other aspects of good governance, or rather 
good enough governance, are at stake than in larger states or even in super 
states. 
Small states hardly have to bother about violations of human rights in China, 
they will not be listened to anyway. They don‟t need to bother about their 
international position vis-à-vis Russia or the United States. They cannot beat 
them anyway. Nor do they have to worry about their position over the relations 
between Israel and the Palestinians, because this does not impact anyway. 
On the other hand whereas in large systems of law interpersonal trust is perhaps 
of minor importance, because transaction costs and especially the prevention of 
what is called moral hazard, are minimized by extensive institutionalization, in 
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small states interpersonal trust as a form of social capital - might be of utmost 
importance for reducing transaction costs and one needs to avoid that for the 
sake of preventing transaction costs one introduces even more costly 
institutions.  
One of the problems is that institutionalization can be destructive for such trust. 
To give an example: In the old days, when smoking was not immediately 
associated with being a pariah of society, people asked one another: “Do you 
mind when I smoke a cigarette”. Depending on the answer one took a cigarette 
or not. This informal interaction in itself created basic interpersonal trust. 
Nowadays, laws and regulations tell us where it is allowed to smoke and where 
this is prohibited. The consequence is that people just look where they are. If it 
is a smoking area, they smoke. If it is prohibited, often they do not. But what is 
missing is the mutual interaction and the interest in one another and eventually 
the loss of what we should cherish, that is, basic trust. Regulations and 
institutionalization take over and the downside is that natural basic relations of 
trust diminish and even disappear (cf. Sztompka, 1999)16. 
The same goes, inter alia, for governmental institutions. Large nation-states - in 
Europe especially France has this reputation – often try to formalize and 
institutionalize everything. It is their solution for all problems. They act like my 
daughter: “No matter what the problem, shopping solves it all” 
3.3. The one-size-fits-all approach  
If all the above is true more generally, the recommendation would be that it 
might be counterproductive just to transfer institutions from outside, as if it 
were one-size-fits-all solutions, even if they seem to be best practices in the 
country of origin. An example is provided by the situation in Central European 
countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and their strive to become member of 
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the European Union, they were required to copy the community acquis or 
acquis communautaire from the European Union, whether the regulations fitted 
their situation or not. The criticism on those countries afterwards was, of 
course, that not everything had been properly implemented and certainly not 
everything was seen as rational, legitimate, effective and efficient within the 
context of the recipient country. One could have predicted this beforehand. 
One of the causes of such unwarranted and problematic mimesis, is found in the 
role of external advisors. Just to return to the Central and East European 
countries when they made their transition from centrally steered economies to 
free market systems, and were confronted with unemployment for the first time, 
Western advisors stepped in and provided advice. Characteristic of much of this 
advice is that they told the recipient countries how they did it at home. Because 
at home they were wealthier, the recipients should just copy those standards (cf. 
Brunsson & Jacobsson 200017; Røvik 200218). The French advisors suggested to 
use the French forms for the registration of unemployment. And not without a 
cause: Equality before the law is crucial. However, they did not suggest to use 
just one form, but a big pack of forms, exemplary for the way the process was 
bureaucratized in France. For the small Central and East European countries the 
implementation thereof implied huge administrative costs, without any 
immediate effects regarding the reduction of the emerging problem of 
unemployment (cf. Sobis & De Vries, 200919). Small countries in transition can 
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even become completely confused because of the advice they get from foreign 
experts and advisors. In Romania, when it underwent its transition, US advisors 
told them the best thing to do was to decentralize – it was the dominant trend in 
the USA and that was paradise on earth, was it not? Simultaneously the French 
advisors, paid by the EU, told Romanian government to centralize. That was the 
way it was done in France, and France was an exemplary EU-member, was it 
not? In the end, of course, all the contradictory advice fell flat. One wonders 
whether the lacking and slow progress in such transition countries was due to 
the standardizers coming from outside and whether the real progress occurred 
despite these advisors (cf. Sobis & De Vries, 2009).  
 
4. The State of Aruba 
So you may ponder, what has all this to do with Aruba as a small system of law 
and its public administration? Well, perhaps you recognized some of the above 
and see it applicable to Aruba, but in general I must disappoint you: the answer 
at this moment is “It has nothing to do with Aruba yet”. The reason is that a 
thorough diagnosis of what is going on here, in my eyes, is still severely 
lacking. I hardly know anything about Aruba, its public administration nor its 
culture. But then I ask you, what do you think you know yourself about Aruba 
and the state of public affairs in Aruba? More than me, obviously, but is that 
“good enough” to judge the public governance in this small system of law and 
to provide advice on what to do? 
Of course, you as well as I have read all the reports, mostly in Dutch and of 
Dutch origin, about what is happening in Aruba, among others, documents such 
as “Checks-and-balances in Caribische bestuurssystemen” (Nauta & De Goede, 
2007) and the recent WODC report on “De Staat van het Openbaar Bestuur in 
Aruba” (WODC, 2011). But everything these reports tell me is that Aruba has a 
terrible reputation. All reports depart from the same sources in the 1990s and no 
matter what actually happened afterwards, Aruba still faces the same 
prejudices. Well now, I don‟t know if anything actually improved. That is 
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something I could unfortunately not detect in those reports. I do see that the 
theoretical analysis is stable over time, that each incident is interpreted as a 
verification of the basic theory and adds up to your shady reputation. The 
theoretical analysis goes as follows; Aruba is a small island state and therefore 
it faces moral hazard. From the analyst point of view this is framed as being 
part of inevitable nepotism, fraud, bad governance and hopelessness of the 
situation. 
However, simultaneously I see Aruba having a Human Development Index of 
0,88 which far exceeds the figures common in other Caribbean states. I see a 
UNDP website on Aruba telling the literacy rates are 96,5%; the proportion of 
the population using an improved drinking water source being 100%; a GDP 
per capita of 25,231 US $; the life expectancy at birth being 73 years; 42 
internet users per 100 inhabitants; a population growth in the last 10 years of 
12,5%, which is indicative for feelings of safety and stability; a diminishing 
average household size, indicative for progress; average incomes between 2,000 
and 3,000 Aruban florins; more than 95% of the population having a mobile 
phone; and 81% of the population owning a house20. 
I have to make analyses in detail and have to see whether the statistics are an 
adequate reflection of reality, but at first sight, it seems - with all the provisions 
and conditions - that on the outcome side, that is, the current state of the Aruban 
people, Aruba must have done something right. 
This adds to the puzzle. How can it be that a public administration and 
government with such a bad reception, nevertheless produces outcomes for its 
population which are pleasing, to say the least?  
                                                 
 
 
20 http://www.cbs.aw/cbs/ 
Summary results Census 2010. found on: 
http://www.censo2010.aw/images/stories/pressrelease%20census%202010%20nederlands.pdf  
18 
 
Is it the case that what seems to be the case is different from what is actually the 
case? Perhaps the relation between good governance and good outcomes is 
more complex than expected at first sight. Is something missing in our 
understanding? Or is the image of government very different from reality? Such 
questions can only be settled by doing comparative research and I am happy to 
be enabled to conduct such research. 
5. Concluding 
If the concept of good governance is asking too much where clarity and 
simplicity might be in order, especially in small systems of law; if the concept 
is based on dubious assumptions, because what government does might be as 
important as how it does it, and if it is based on a one-size-fits-all ideology 
while optimal organizational cultures and structures are contingent, perhaps the 
concept of good-enough-governance is to be preferred. The problem to be 
answered  by empirical research is: what is good enough; what is the optimum 
amount of institutionalization and to which degree does this depend on scale, 
culture and other boundary conditions? 
 
Ladies and gentlemen.  
 
I can go on reflecting, but you and I need a drink to celebrate this installation of 
the governor‟s chair. Before we part just a few personal words. The label of this 
position is “Governor‟s chair”, and you as an audience at this moment will 
know that it was a well-received present for the university given at the occasion 
of 25 years of Status Aparte for Aruba.  
 
So with the endowment to me, I am a present.  
Hmm…. I can see people thinking: He…a present?  
I can even see my wife thinking: “Why didn‟t I think of that… giving him away 
… before”. 
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In the future people probably forget the reason for installing this chair and only 
read “governor‟s chair”. And they start to think: “Who is he, that Michiel de 
Vries, sitting in the chair of the governor?‟ Well now, there will be a printed 
version of this oration and they can read that it is without any arrogance that I 
have accepted this position. It is not something to be afraid of, as if the 
governor‟s chair is occupied by someone who has political ambitions or even is 
choosing political sides. To be honest, as a scholar, I‟d rather starve amidst 
plenty. 
It is a post installed by the governor within this beautiful university for 
academic purposes. To give scholarly answers to pressing questions. Questions 
only to be answered after doing thorough research. I accepted because I love to 
do such research, to do research together with my colleagues at the University 
of Aruba and with the Aruban students. I am enthusiastic to tell students and 
administrators about the results of this research, curious about almost 
everything that happens in public administration and eager to find explanations. 
But recommendations about what to do? You have to wait. 
 
I would like to thank some people who made this appointment possible.  
 
First of all his Excellency, the Governor of Aruba, mr. Refunjol and the staff of 
the cabinet of the governor, especially Peter Benschop and Martijn Boelen.  
Secondly I would like to mention the president of the board of trustees of the 
University of Aruba, mr. drs. Gibbs,  
Thirdly, special thanks go to the members of the sounding board group.  
Fourthly, the members of the Appointments Advisory Committee have put their 
trust in me. I am grateful and hope I don‟t disappoint you.  
Special thanks also go to the faculty dean Eric Mijts, with whom I hope to have 
a prosperous cooperation and who was so kind to give extensive help in the last 
three months.  
20 
 
Furthermore, I would like to thank the Radboud University in Nijmegen and 
especially the dean of the Faculty of Management Sciences, who supported this 
endowment to me.  
Last but not least, there is my family. My dearest wife and three daughters, 
Lies, Linda, Liza and Machteld. Lies is here today and she is a precious person 
without who I could not have come this far. Thank you Lies. Today is 
December 1st. It was the birthday of my late mother and of Lies her late father. 
It is indeed a special day. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is time to do research to answer the questions posed. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
